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The impact of the decision in Kent on the practical problem of regu-
lating passports is unfortunate. It leaves the Secretary powerless to
deny passports save on the limited grounds approved in that decision.
There is a real and pressing necessity for such regulation.27 The
problem admits of no uncertainty in its solution, for it is vital to the in-
terests of the nation as a whole.
The Communist party openly seeks as its ultimate goal world revolu-
tion; to attribute to it any lesser aim is to ignore the essence of its
existence. We need cite no authority that its machinations are the
greatest concern of our government today. Statements to the effect that
denial of a passport on the basis of membership in the Communist party
or adherence to its cause is denial merely on the basis of "political
beliefs and associations" are open to serious question. It is hoped that
the use of such language by the majority in Kent was inadvertent.
That the exigencies of the moment should be used as grounds for
denial of constitutional rights is contrary to the basic principles of free
government.2 8  But, on the other hand, it must be recognized that there
is a problem that touches on the well-being of the nation, and that there
are citizens whose purposes in going abroad justify their being forced
to forfeit their rights. The problem must be to find some way to
determine, using substantive criteria established by congressional authori-
ty and standard procedures that protect the individual from arbitrary
action, whether the individual in question deserves to forfeit his right
to travel.
E. OSBORNE AYscuE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Little Rock School Litigation-Re-examination
of North Carolina Laws
[T]he Constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color ... can
neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or
state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by
them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
"ingeniously or ingenuously."'
With these words, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron2 emphati-
" This necessity is evidenced by the fact that several days after this decision
was handed down the President sent a message to Congress urging legislation
delegating the power to regulate to the Secretary. It read in part: "I wish to
emphasize the urgency of the legislation I have recommended. Each day and
week that passes without it exposes us to great danger." 104 CoNG. REc. 11849(1958). The Eighty-fifth Congress adjourned without having acted on this problem.
28 Ex parte Endo, 393 U.S. 283 (1944).
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) quoting from Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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cally rejected the application of the Little Rock School Board for a two
and one-half year suspension of its court-approved s desegregation
program. In order to fully appreciate the import of this decision, a
brief review of its background is necessary.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, in the Brown case,4 held that
enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a state denied the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court expressly overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson5 which bad been relied on by the southern states for
almost fifty years. However, the Court delayed formulation of a decree
to effectuate this decision pending further argument. This decree was
rendered May 31, 1955, 6 and called for the district courts concerned to
require "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance'" 7 with
the Brown ruling and to take such action as was necessary to bring
about the end of racial segregation in the public schools "with all de-
liberate speed." s
The Court pointed out that once such a start had been made, the
courts might find that additional time was necessary to carry out the
ruling in an effective manner, but that the burden was on the defendants
to establish that such time was necessary.
Following these decisions, the Little Rock District School Board
formulated a plan for desegregation. This plan was approved by the
district court9 and in pursuance thereof, nine Negroes were scheduled
to be admitted in September 1957 to Central High School which had
over 2,000 students. This plan failed, however, when the Governor
of the state dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the
school grounds and placed the school "off limits" to colored students. 10
Upon investigation, the district court found that the Governor was
obstructing the court-approved plan of desegregation and entered a
preliminary injunction against him and officers of the National Guard
enjoining prevention of the attendance of Negro children at Central
High School, and other obstruction or interference with the orders of
the court in connection with the desegregation plan." The National
Guard was removed and on Monday, September 23, 1957, the nine
Negro children entered the high school under the protection of the
'Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd, 243 F.2d 361
(8th Cir. 1957).
' Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
' Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).TId. at 300. 8 Id. at 301.
' Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1957), af'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1957).
10 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd, Faubus v. United
States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
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Little Rock Police Department. They were removed, however, because
of difficulties in controlling a large and demonstrating crowd which had
gathered.
On September 25, 1957, the President dispatched federal troops to
the school and the Negro students were admitted.12 Later the federal
troops were replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who stayed
at the school for the remainder of the school year.
In February 1958, the School Board filed a petition in the district
court seeking a postponement of its program of desegregation.13 It was
contended that because of the extreme public hostility, attributed by the
Supreme Court to the attitudes of the Governor and the legislature, a
sound education system could not. be maintained with the attendance of
the Negro students at Central High School.
The district court granted the relief requested by the board.14  This
was reversed by the court of appeals' 5 and the reversal was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the present litigation. 16
Although the Court was called upon to decide only one narrow
point, viz., whether or not open hostility by the people of a state toward
a School Board's plan for desegregation is sufficient reason to warrant
a delay of such plan, it very painstakingly stated its position regarding
the whole school desegregation problem. With its assertion that no
evasive scheme to avoid desegregation would be tolerated whether it be
attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously"'17 it indicated that no plan
would be allowed to circumvent the order of the Court.
Is North Carolina affected by this decision? This state has a three-
fold plan for dealing with the problems posed by the Brown decision.' s
It consists of (1) a pupil assignment law vesting authority in the local
school boards to assign students residing within their administrative
12 See Pollitt, Presidential Use of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History,
36 N.C.L. REv. 117 (1957).
" Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
14 Aaron v. Cooper, supra. note 13. The 1955 Brown case language to the effect
that additional time might be necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective
manner once a start had been made was construed to mean that such time would be
allowed when necessary to preserve the public peace. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this view and quoted from Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917), as
follows: "It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace
by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preserva-
tion of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
15Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958).
2' The Court rendered the decision September 12, 1958, but the opinion was not
given until September 29, 1958.
1 Ingenious means talented, clever, shrewd, or inventive while ingenuous
implies high-mindedness or candor. Webster's New International Dictionary.
" For an excellent discussion of North Carolina's new legislative enactments
and constitutional amendments on education, see Wettach, North Carolina School
Legislation, 35 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1956).
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units to a public school, 19 (2) an amendment to the state constitution
which provides for education expense grants to be given to students to
enable them to attend private schools under certain conditions, and 20 (3)
an amendment to the constitution known as the local option plan whereby
the people of a local unit may close their schools when a majority of its
electorate so desires, 2
1
This plan originated in the report of a committee 22 appointed by
Governor William B. Umstead and headed by the Honorable Thomas J.
Pearsall, "to study the difficult and far reaching problems"23 presented
by the Brown decision. Under the heading of "Recommendations and
Conclusions," the committee reported inter alia, the following:
The mixing of the races forthwith in the public schools throughout
the State cannot be accomplished and should not be attempted.
The schools of our State are so intimately related to the customs
and feelings of the people of each community that their effective
operation is impossible except in conformity with community at-
titudes. The Committee feels that the compulsory mixing of the
races in our schools, on a State-wide basis and without regard to
local conditions and assignment factors other than race, would
alienate public support of the schools to such an extent that they
could not be operated successfully.24
This report, along with the brief that the state had filed in the Brown
case,25 was "approved as a declaration of the policy of the state"20 by
the North Carolina General Assembly.
In order to implement this policy, the North Carolina General As-
sembly, on the Pearsall committee's recommendation, enacted the Pupil
11 N.C. Gz . STAT. §§ 115-176 through -179 (1955).0 N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
21Ibid.
22 This committee was first entitled the Special Advisory Committee on Educa-
tion and was later denominated the North Carolina Advisory Committee on
Education. It is commonly referred to as the Pearsall Committee.
"' N.C. Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1692.
2, Id. at 1693.
Although North Carolina was not a party to the litigation in the Brown
case, it was invited to file a brief amicus curiae. This brief, the purpose of which
was to aid the Supreme Court in formulating a plan to effectuate its 1954 desegrega-
tion decision, stated: "The people of North Carolina know the value of the public
school. They also know the value of a social structure in which two distinct races
can live together as separate groups, each proud of its own contribution to that
society and recognizing its dependence upon the other group. They are determined,
if possible, to educate all of the children of the State. They are also determined
to maintain their society as it now exists with separate and distinct racial groups
in the North Carolina community.
"The people of North Carolina firmly believe that the record of North Carolina
in the field of education demonstrates the practicability of education of separate
races in separate schools. They also believe that the achievements of the Negro
people of North Carolina demonstrate that such educational system has not in-
stilled in them any sense of inferiority which handicaps them in their efforts to
make lasting and substantial contributions to their State." Quoted in N.C. Sess.
Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1693.
" N.C. Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, at 1693.
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Assignment Act 2 7 as the first part of the three-fold plan. Without
mentioning race, the act merely directs each local school board 28 to assign
the children within the school district "so as to provide for the orderly
and efficient administration of the public schools, and provide for the
effective instruction, health, safety, and general welfare of the pupils."'2 9
Pursuant to this plan, the local school boards have to date assigned
thirteen Negro children to what were formerly white schools. This is
in accord with the declared policy of the state"0 to allow each local unit
to decide whether or not it desires to desegregate.
Assuming that it is constitutional on its face,31 is the plan consti-
tutional in its context and application? Resolution 29 recites that "the
mixing of the races in the public schools within the State cannot be
accomplished and if attempted would alienate public support of the
schools to such an extent that they could not be operated successfully. '32
But this very reason for postponing integration was asserted by the
Little Rock School Board and rejected by the Supreme Court in the
Cooper decision. Reading this state "policy" into the Pupil Assignment
Act as it now functions, it is believed that the Supreme Court would
find it either an "ingenious" or an "ingenuous" scheme by the state to
deprive Negro rights of the equal protection of the laws.33  It is not to
be doubted that the courts will be quick to strike down any action by
27 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 through -179 (1955).
-1 Prior to these amendments, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-352 (1952) provided that
school children attend school within the district in which they resided unless assigned
elsewhere by the State Board of Education. The only criteria for making an
assignment outside the district in which the student resided was when it was more
economical for the efficient operation of the schools.
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955). This new legislation authorizes each local
board of education to assign students residing within its administrative unit to
a public school whether such school is within its administrative unit or not.
o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955).
' In Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), it was contended that the
North Carolina Pupil Enrollment Act (denominated Pupil Assignment Act by
1956 amendment) was unconstitutional on its face because it vested discretion in
an administrative body without adequate standards for the exercise of this dis-
cretion. The court held that, as to this contention, it was not unconstitutional on
its face. Alabama's school placement law, which like North Carolina's makes
no mention of race, was declared constitutional on its face in Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd,
27 U.S.L. WIxa 3159 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1958), in spite of legislative resolutions
adopted before passage of the placement law which indicated an intention
not to follow the Browm case. However, it must be noted that the School
Board denied the petitioners' allegations that they were denied the right
to attend the white public schools solely on the basis of race and the
court found no evidence to indicate that this was the sole reason for such denial.
But see Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.
1957), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957), where Virginia's school placement plan,
when considered in the light of its legislative history, was held to be so patently
bad as to be unconstitutional on its face.
2 N.C. Sess. Laws (1955), Resolution 29, 1692-93.
"2 In the Virginia case, suPra note 31, the court held that inasmuch as the
criteria for assignment was based partly on the race of the applicant, that it was a
violation of the constitutional provision guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the local school boards pursuant to the plan which appears to be motivated
by race.
The second part of the plan recommended by the committee is found
in a 1956 amendment to the constitution and in legislative statutes of
the same year.3 4  These provisions authorize "payment of education
expense grants from any State or local public funds for the private
education of ...a child who is assigned against the wishes of his
parents . . . to a public school attended by a child of another race." 83 5
However, no child shall be eligible for such a grant unless he attends
a private school "recognized and approved under '36 and "found to be in
compliance with"37 article 32 of the North Carolina General Statutes on
Education.3 8 Since this is an integral part of the state's program de-
signed to cope with the Brown decision, these grants, like the Pupil
Assignment Act, may be viewed in the light of the legislature's declared
policy, and if so viewed, their authorization would be constitutionally
suspect 3 9 Furthermore, in Rice v. Elmore, ° the court held that the
' N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 12; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-274 through -295 (1955).
" N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-282 (1955).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-285 (1955).
11N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-255 through -257 (1955). Private schools in
North Carolina cannot operate lawfully at any time unless they are regulated and
supervised by the State Board of Education and meet the standards required of
the public schools with respect to the following: (a) grading of instruction (b)
promotion of pupils (c) the courses of study for each grade (d) the manner in
which these courses are conducted (e) the qualifications and certification of teachers.
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is state action which
is prohibited by the Constitution and not purely private action. As the Court
said in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) : "The constitutional provision,
therefore, must mean that no agency of the State . . . shall deny to any person
within its jurisdicton the equal protection of the laws." It is submitted that the
amount of private regulation embodied in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-255 through
-257 (1955) might induce a holding that such schools are agencies of the
state so that denial of admission to Negroes by them because of race would be
unconstitutional. Certainly it has taken far less state regulation to class as state
action what is in form private action. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953),
where a private Texas organization held pre-primary, elections to determine their
candidates for the state primaries and restricted its membership to white persons.
The Court found this discrimination to be state action'although the Court split as
to the reasons for its conclusion.
" That the purpose for these grants is to avoid the desegregation order of the
Brown decisions cannot fairly be denied. Section 115-274 of the North Carolina
General Statutes states in'part that "Our people need to be assured that no child
will be forced to attend a school with children of another race in order to get an
education. It is the purpose of the State of North Carolina to make available,
under the conditions and qualifications set out in this article, education expense
grants for the private education of any child of any race residing in this State."
The courts have already struck down two evasive schemes which were designed
to avoid the desegregation order. See Aaron v. Cooper, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2236(8th Cir. Nov. 18, 1958), where private corporations leased state buildings to con-
duct schools on a segregated basis and Allen v. Charlottesville School Board, 27
U.S.L. WEEK 2173 (D.C. Va. Oct. 14, 195.8), where the State of Virginia paid
teachers to teach in private, segregated schools.
o 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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Democratic party must allow Negroes to vote in its primary elections
even though the state had repealed all laws which related to the Demo-
cratic party and it was functioning as a club. The court reasoned that
since primaries had become a part of the machinery for choosing public
officials, they should be subject to the same tests of discrimination as
those applied to general elections. If North Carolina private schools
admitted pupils who had availed themselves of state tuition grants,
might not the Court hold that these institutions thus became agencies of
the state, fulfilling the functions of the public schools, and require that
admission to these private schools be granted to Negroes on a non-
discriminatory basis ?41
The third and final part of the Pearsall plan is found in article IX 42
of the constitution and supplementing legislation of 1956. It permits
any board of education to "call for an election on the question of closing
the public schools" 48 and directs the board of education to suspend the
operation of such public schools "when a majority of the votes cast in
such election are in favor" 44 of suspending the schools. This plan has
not yet been put into operation and consequently has not been tested.
However, suits testing the constitutionality of the Arkansas and Virginia
school closing plans are now pending. In Virginia, the litigants contend
among other things that closing the schools in Norfolk while leaving
Richmond schools open denies Norfolk children equal protection of the
laws. Another possible argument is that legislation by the state authoriz-
ing the closing of a previously segregated white school if a Negro ex-
ercises his constitutional right to attend it is the use of a governmental
power to enforce segregation, and, hence is unlawful. 45
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Supreme Court in the Cooper
decision not only announced a decision, it also expressed a mood. It
went out of its way to point out that state officials take an oath of office
to support the Constitution of the United States and hence are obligated
to comply with the spirit as well as the terms of the desegregation de-
cisions. One suspects that all plans aimed at continued segregation of
" The authorization of such grants by the state might be subject to attack from
still another angle. Any taxpayer who had not availed himself of such grants could
seek to enjoin this expenditure of state funds on the grounds that this would be a
non-public use of public funds in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Teer v. Jordan, 232 N.C. 48, 59 S.E.2d 359 (1950), states
that a taxpayer has the legal right to bring an action against the state or any
agency which is using public funds for an unlawful purpose.
" N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-265 (1955).
"Ibid.
Professor Douglas B. Maggs of the Duke University Law School included
this argument in a prepared statement to a Joint Meeting of the Special Session
of the North Carolina General Assembly on the Legislation Proposed by the North
Carolina Advisory Committee on Education. (unpublished in University of North
Carolina Law School Library, 1956).
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school children will be nullified as either "ingenious" or "ingenuous"
attempts to evade the Constitution, a document which, as has been said,
is "colorblind."4 6
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians
In the last two decades the United States has been confronted with a
major world war and a police action in Korea. These have necessitated
wholesale conscription of millions of American citizens to supply the
armies needed, and the additional use of citizens in civilian capacities to
complement these armies. In such situations the military requires
prompt and efficient means of dealing with personnel who commit acts
threatening the discipline and morale of the armed forces. Resort was
made to the age-old military tribunal, the court-martial.' Thus during
war time courts-martial have long exercised jurisdiction over uniformed
military personnel and civilians accompanying the armed forces in the
field.2
However, upon cessation of hostilities, there arises the question of
continued military jurisdiction over persons who committed crimes while
on active duty but were separated prior to being charged with such
crimes. The general rule was that a discharge or separation divested the
military of jurisdiction.3 In United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,4
the Supreme Court held this rule applicable to one who was discharged
and immediately re-enlisted, reasoning that courts-martial could not
assume jurisdiction without a grant of congressional authority.
This case motivated Congress,5 in enacting the new Uniform Code
of Military Justice6 (hereafter referred to as UCMJ), to include article
3(a),7 a provision retaining military jurisdiction over serious offenders
'" Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
'For a concise historical development of courts-martial, see WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 45-51 (2d ed. reprint 1920).
'See, e.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S.(20 How.) 65 (1858) ; Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945) ;
Ex parte Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub. nom. United States
ex rel. Campo v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In re Berue, 54 F. Supp.
252 (S.D. Ohio 1944) ; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943).
'MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 14 (1951); MANUAL FOR
CoURTs-MARTim, U.S. ARmy, 9 (1949).
'336 U.S. 210 (1949).
' H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 486, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
610 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. V, 1958).
7 "[N]o person charged with having committed, while in a status in which
he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confine-
ment for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts
of the United States ... may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial
by reason of the termination of that status." 10 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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